H7N9responsible for an ongoing epidemic in China and currently has the greatest pandemic potential among the Type A subtypes  H6N1which only infected one person, who recovered Influenzavirus B Influenza virus nomenclature for a Fujian flu virus This genus has one species, influenza B virus. Influenza B almost exclusively infects humans  and is less common than influenza A.
Current recommendations for interpandemic and pandemic alert periods include: Animal biosafety level 2 ABSL-2 facilities are appropriate for work with these viruses in animal models.
Noncontemporary, wild-type human influenza H2N2 strains should be handled with increased caution.
Important considerations in working with these strains are the number of years since an antigenically related virus last circulated and the potential for a susceptible population.
BSL-3 and ABSL-3 practices, procedures, and facilities are recommended with rigorous adherence to additional respiratory protection and clothing change protocols. Cold-adapted, live attenuated H2N2 vaccine strains may continue to be worked with at BSL-2 facilities.
The risk to laboratory workers is unknown at present, but the pandemic potential is thought to be significant. Until further risk assessment data are available, the following practices and conditions News management of influenza outbreak recommended for manipulation of reconstructed influenza viruses and laboratory animals infected with the viruses.
These practices and procedures are considered minimum standards for work with the fully reconstructed virus. BSL-3 and ABSL-3 practices, procedures, and facilities Large laboratory animals, such as nonhuman primates, housed in primary-barrier systems in ABSL-3 facilities Rigorous adherence to additional respiratory protection and clothing change protocols Use of negative-pressure, HEPA-filtered respirators or PAPRs Use of HEPA filtration for treatment of exhaust air Amendment of personnel practices to include personal showers prior to exiting the laboratory Manipulating HPAI News management of influenza outbreak in biomedical research laboratories requires similar caution, because some strains may pose increased risk to laboratory workers and have significant agricultural and economic implications.
BSL-3 and ABSL-3 practices, procedures, and facilities are recommended, along with clothing change and personal showering protocols. When considering the biocontainment level and attendant practices and procedures for work with other influenza recombinant or reassortant viruses, the local Institutional Biosafety Committee should consider, but not limit consideration, to the following in the conduct of protocol-driven risk assessment.
The gene constellation used Clear evidence of reduced virus replication in the respiratory tract of appropriate animal models, compared with the level of replication of the wild-type parent virus from which it was derived Evidence of clonal purity and phenotypic stability The number of years since a virus that was antigenically related to the donor of the HA and NA genes last circulated If adequate risk assessment data are not available, a more cautious approach utilizing elevated biocontainment levels and practices is warranted.
There may be specific requirements regarding the setting of containment levels in institutions that are subject to NIH guidelines. Recommendations for testing of clinical specimens from patients suspected to have H5N1 influenza include CDC Culture from patients suspected of having avian influenza, other novel influenza strains, or severe acute respiratory syndrome SARS coronavirus should be conducted only under enhanced BSL-3 containment also see Biosecurity below.
This includes controlled access, double-door entry with changing room and shower, use of respirators, decontamination of all waste, and showering out of all personnel.
These diagnostic activities must be kept separate from routine influenza diagnostic activities eg, probable H1 or H3 isolates to prevent recombination. Culture biocontainment recommendations should be implemented when IFA is used for culture identification. Direct detection methods, including commercial antigen detection assays and reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction RT-PCRshould be conducted under BSL-2 conditions with a class II biological safety cabinet.
Serologic methods require BSL-2 containment. If H5N1 avian influenza virus is presumptively identified by one of the above direct methods, further work should be conducted using the enhanced BSL-3 procedures described for culture.
Any new or re-emergent human influenza strain with suspected pandemic potential should be treated as described for H5N1 avian influenza. Additional requirements and recommendations apply for laboratory work involving live animals. Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act.
Both registered and exempt laboratories that identify a Select Agent contained in a specimen presented for diagnosis, verification, or proficiency testing must secure the agent against theft, loss, or release until transfer or destruction.
Unregistered laboratories must transfer or destroy select agents within 7 days of identification. HA and NA targets are used for specific identification of avian subtypes. PCR generally is not used for strain-level identification, which is based on serologic markers.
Testing with the new assay is limited to LRN-designated laboratories. Immunofluorescence IFA methods may be used to identify influenza to the species level influenza A or B or specific H subtypes including H5 directly from specimens or cell culture.
Direct immunofluorescence DFA methods are faster and less labor intensive than IFA but are less sensitive and are currently only available for genus-specific detection see other rapid direct tests. Molecular microarray tests using flow-through chip technology A molecular microarray for influenza typing and subtyping using a flow-thru chip platform was initially described in Kessler Two reports released in August involved a study of the FluChip diagnostic microarray and showed that the test could be a valuable tool in identifying influenza viruses MehlmannTownsend Rapid tests Call ; CDC: Rapid tests detect viral antigen generally nucleoprotein or enzymatic activity NA directly on patient specimens using a variety of platforms.
Rapid tests are designed to identify influenza A only, influenza A or B without identifying the type, or influenza A or B with type-specific identification. Sensitivity is generally greater in children than adults and is greater early in the course of illness.
For this reason, some items on this page will be unavailable. For more information about this message, please visit this page: About initiativeblog.com Animal influenza viruses are distinct from human seasonal influenza viruses and do not easily transmit between humans.
However, zoonotic influenza viruses - animal influenza viruses that may occasionally infect humans through direct or indirect contact - can cause disease in humans ranging from a.
This page highlights new and noteworthy influenza-related developments and feature stories by influenza season. See What’s New on this Site for a comprehensive . Disease Outbreak News (DONs) Latest DONs. Yellow fever – Republic of the Congo 7 September ; Ebola virus disease – Democratic Republic of the Congo.
This page highlights new and noteworthy influenza-related developments and feature stories by influenza season. See What’s New on this Site for a comprehensive list of all new posting and updates to content on this site!
Influenza Updates: Flu activity in the U.S. is low now, but expected to pick up in the coming weeks. CDC on Flu Vaccine: CDC’s vaccine recommendations for the flu season are now available.; CDC recommends yearly flu vaccination for people 6 months and older.